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Revue économique, 30(2), 420-448.

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in the second-price and the English auctions. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction designs, neither in bidding strategies nor in expected revenue.

Keywords : workingPaper,

Revue économique, 30(2), 420-448.

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in the second-price and the English auctions. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction designs, neither in bidding strategies nor in expected revenue.

Keywords : workingPaper, nobody,

JEBO (2021), 30(2), 420-448.

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in the second-price and the English auctions. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction designs, neither in bidding strategies nor in expected revenue.

Keywords : economic, stastics, truth,

JEBO (2021), 30(2), 420-448.

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in the second-price and the English auctions. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction designs, neither in bidding strategies nor in expected revenue.

Keywords : economic, stastics, truth,

WP 20-02.

Belgium has implemented, following the example of other coun- tries, in-work benefit policies since the early 2000’s, with the objective of mak- ing work pay and doing so, get more people at work. Belgian in-work benefits differ from most other in-work benefits as eligibility requires low hourly earn- ings. Their generosity tends to increase over time. We study the effects further extensions of those benefits would have both on labour supply and welfare, us- ing a random-utility - random-opportunity model estimated on cross-sectional SILC datasets. Results show that further increasing the benefits will mostly slightly increase labour supply and welfare of low-to-middle welfare deciles, but at very high net cost per job created. We compare our results with existing re- search and explain some mechanisms that possibly lead to an underestimation of negative intensive margin labour supply responses in previous simulations.

Keywords : In-work Benefits, Labour supply, Random utility model, Discrete choice, Microsimulation,

.

In most European countries, poor cohabiting adults are eligible to lower per capita social assistance benefits than poor adults living alone, as they are supposed to benefit from economies of scale in household expenses as housing, heating costs, etc. In this paper, we show that this aspect of social assistance varies strongly within Europe and use this variation to identify a possible causality of social assistance scheme parameters on cohabitation decisions. Our statistical analysis suggests that high benefits for cohabitants decrease the number of poor one-person households significantly. We discuss the consequences of this result on government expenditures and touch upon externalities that strengthen the case for higher cohabitant amounts in countries with strongly differentiated rates.

Keywords : Guaranteed Minimum Income, Cohabitation, Divorce, Public transfers,