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_Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 187 – April 2021.

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also reveals the bidders’ payments to an outside observer. We find that the all-pay sealed-bid auction in which the bidders’ payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism underperforms in terms of efficiency relative to the winner-pay auctions.

Keywords : scientific publication, game theory,

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy - Vol. 30, p. 420-448 (2021).

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in the second-price auction and the English auction. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction designs, neither in bidding strategies nor in expected revenue. This is because the presence or absence of an increasing price clock, affects signaling incentives differently in both auction formats, and thereby also the bidders’ incentives to overbid their types. This leads to a strictly higher expected revenue in the second-price auction than in the English auction. Our analysis is completed by a comparison with other disclosure policies. Applications include art auctions and charity auctions.

Keywords : scientific publication, game theory,

Journal of Applied Econometrics, (2021).

We analyze the impact of choosing an elite school on high school graduation in an early tracking system in Flanders (Belgium). Whereas elite schools offer only an academic track, most other schools offer multiple tracks. On average, students experience a 3.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of obtaining a degree. We find that the effects are heterogeneous. On average, students who self-select into elite schools do not experience an effect. However, students who do not choose an elite school would experience positive effects. Our results can be explained by different tracking decisions in both types of schools.

Keywords : scientific publication, education economics,