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 Vasylyna Sheremeta  

 (2021).

   Equity effects of congestion pricing 

WP 21-01.

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Road traffic is necessary for a successful functioning of market economy and its volume is positively correlated with economic development. However, its rapid increase fostered by economic growth is problematic as road traffic results in numerous externalities. The externalities resulting from traffic are costs that are created but not born by motorists that create them. Among these are such ‘classic’ externalities as congestion, air pollution and noise, traffic accidents, carbon emissions, etc. However, the recent evidence suggests that apart from these typical traffic externalities there may be many more non-obvious ones, e.g. longer emergency response times and resulting higher average monetary damages from fires (Brent and Beland, 2020). Traffic externalities can be internal to transportation system meaning that they affect motorists only, such as congestion, car crashes, wear and tear of road infrastructure, etc. But many externalities are external to transportation system and affect non-users, such as air and noise pollution, carbon emissions etc. Therefore, it is crucial to find the best tools to deal with the road transport externalities.

Keywords : transport economics,

 Antoine de Mahieu  

 (2021).

   Living Apart or Together: Effect of Social Benefits. 

Revue économique, 30(2), 420-448.

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In most European countries, poor cohabiting adults are eligible to lower per capita social assistance benefits than poor adults living alone, as they are supposed to benefit from economies of scale in household expenses as housing, heating costs, etc. In this paper, we show that this aspect of social assistance varies strongly within Europe and use this variation to identify a possible causality of social assistance scheme parameters on cohabitation decisions. Our statistical analysis suggests that high benefits for cohabitants decrease the number of poor one-person households significantly. We discuss the consequences of this result on government expenditures and touch upon externalities that strengthen the case for higher cohabitant amounts in countries with strongly differentiated rates.

Keywords : Guaranteed Minimum Income, Cohabitation, Divorce, Public transfers,

 Antoine de Mahieu  

   

 (2020).

   In-work Benefits in Belgium: Effects on Labour Supply and Welfare 

WP 20-02.

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Belgium has implemented, following the example of other coun- tries, in-work benefit policies since the early 2000’s, with the objective of mak- ing work pay and doing so, get more people at work. Belgian in-work benefits differ from most other in-work benefits as eligibility requires low hourly earn- ings. Their generosity tends to increase over time. We study the effects further extensions of those benefits would have both on labour supply and welfare, us- ing a random-utility - random-opportunity model estimated on cross-sectional SILC datasets. Results show that further increasing the benefits will mostly slightly increase labour supply and welfare of low-to-middle welfare deciles, but at very high net cost per job created. We compare our results with existing re- search and explain some mechanisms that possibly lead to an underestimation of negative intensive margin labour supply responses in previous simulations.

Keywords : labor economics, policy evaluation,

 Antoine de Mahieu  

 (2020).

   Living Apart or Together: Effect of Social Benefits. 

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PDF

In most European countries, poor cohabiting adults are eligible to lower per capita social assistance benefits than poor adults living alone, as they are supposed to benefit from economies of scale in household expenses as housing, heating costs, etc. In this paper, we show that this aspect of social assistance varies strongly within Europe and use this variation to identify a possible causality of social assistance scheme parameters on cohabitation decisions. Our statistical analysis suggests that high benefits for cohabitants decrease the number of poor one-person households significantly. We discuss the consequences of this result on government expenditures and touch upon externalities that strengthen the case for higher cohabitant amounts in countries with strongly differentiated rates.

Keywords : fomily economics, policy evaluation,

 Gilles Grandjean  

 Mathieu Lefebvre  

 Marco Mantovani  

 (2018).

   Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games 

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We analyze experimentally behavior in a finitely repeated public goods game. One of the main results of the literature is that contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two explanations of this pattern have been developed - (i) The population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well (preference-based explanation), and (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper contributes to bridging the gap between these views. We analyze preferences and strategic ability in one design by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both dimensions. Our results highlight the interaction between the two: groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation.

Keywords : Voluntary contribution, conditional cooperation, free riding, strategic sophistication, voluntary contribution,

 Gilles Grandjean  

 Mathieu Lefebvre  

 Marco Mantovani  

 (2018).

   Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games 

WP 18-02.

PDF

We analyze experimentally behavior in a finitely repeated public goods game. One of the main results of the literature is that contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two explanations of this pattern have been developed - (i) The population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well (preference-based explanation), and (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper contributes to bridging the gap between these views. We analyze preferences and strategic ability in one design by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both dimensions. Our results highlight the interaction between the two: groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation.

Keywords : game theory,

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