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We analyze experimentally behavior in a finitely repeated public goods game. One of the main results of the literature is that contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two explanations of this pattern have been developed - (i) The population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well (preference-based explanation), and (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper contributes to bridging the gap between these views. We analyze preferences and strategic ability in one design by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both dimensions. Our results highlight the interaction between the two: groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation.

Keywords : Voluntary contribution, conditional cooperation, free riding, strategic sophistication, voluntary contribution,

WP 18-02.

We analyze experimentally behavior in a finitely repeated public goods game. One of the main results of the literature is that contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two explanations of this pattern have been developed - (i) The population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well (preference-based explanation), and (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper contributes to bridging the gap between these views. We analyze preferences and strategic ability in one design by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both dimensions. Our results highlight the interaction between the two: groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation.

Keywords : Voluntary contribution, conditional cooperation, free riding, strategic sophistication, voluntary contribution,

WP 18-01.

From a survival analysis perspective, bank failure data are often characterized by small default rates and heavy censoring. This empirical evidence can be explained by the existence of a subpopulation of banks likely immune from bankruptcy. In this regard, we use a mixture cure model to separate the factors with an influence on the susceptibility to default from the ones affecting the survival time of susceptible banks. In this paper, we extend a semi-parametric proportional hazards cure model to time-varying covariates and we propose a variable selection technique based on its penalized likelihood. By means of a simulation study, we show how this technique performs reasonably well. Finally, we illustrate an application to commercial bank failures in the United States over the period 2006-2016.

Keywords : Bank failures, Survival Analysis, Mixture Cure Model, Time-varying covariates, Penalized likelihood, SCAD,