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 Antoine de Mahieu  

   

 (2020).

   In-work Benefits in Belgium: Effects on Labour Supply and Welfare 

WP 20-02.

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Belgium has implemented, following the example of other coun- tries, in-work benefit policies since the early 2000’s, with the objective of mak- ing work pay and doing so, get more people at work. Belgian in-work benefits differ from most other in-work benefits as eligibility requires low hourly earn- ings. Their generosity tends to increase over time. We study the effects further extensions of those benefits would have both on labour supply and welfare, us- ing a random-utility - random-opportunity model estimated on cross-sectional SILC datasets. Results show that further increasing the benefits will mostly slightly increase labour supply and welfare of low-to-middle welfare deciles, but at very high net cost per job created. We compare our results with existing re- search and explain some mechanisms that possibly lead to an underestimation of negative intensive margin labour supply responses in previous simulations.

Keywords : labor economics, policy evaluation,

 Antoine de Mahieu  

 (2020).

   Living Apart or Together: Effect of Social Benefits. 

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In most European countries, poor cohabiting adults are eligible to lower per capita social assistance benefits than poor adults living alone, as they are supposed to benefit from economies of scale in household expenses as housing, heating costs, etc. In this paper, we show that this aspect of social assistance varies strongly within Europe and use this variation to identify a possible causality of social assistance scheme parameters on cohabitation decisions. Our statistical analysis suggests that high benefits for cohabitants decrease the number of poor one-person households significantly. We discuss the consequences of this result on government expenditures and touch upon externalities that strengthen the case for higher cohabitant amounts in countries with strongly differentiated rates.

Keywords : fomily economics, policy evaluation,

 Gilles Grandjean  

 Mathieu Lefebvre  

 Marco Mantovani  

 (2018).

   Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games 

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We analyze experimentally behavior in a finitely repeated public goods game. One of the main results of the literature is that contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two explanations of this pattern have been developed - (i) The population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well (preference-based explanation), and (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper contributes to bridging the gap between these views. We analyze preferences and strategic ability in one design by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both dimensions. Our results highlight the interaction between the two: groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation.

Keywords : Voluntary contribution, conditional cooperation, free riding, strategic sophistication, voluntary contribution,

 Gilles Grandjean  

 Mathieu Lefebvre  

 Marco Mantovani  

 (2018).

   Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games 

WP 18-02.

PDF

We analyze experimentally behavior in a finitely repeated public goods game. One of the main results of the literature is that contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two explanations of this pattern have been developed - (i) The population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well (preference-based explanation), and (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper contributes to bridging the gap between these views. We analyze preferences and strategic ability in one design by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both dimensions. Our results highlight the interaction between the two: groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation.

Keywords : game theory,

 Cédric Heuchenne  

 Alessandro Beretta  

 (2018).

   Variable selection in proportional hazards cure model with time-varying covariates, application to US bank failures 

WP 18-01.

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From a survival analysis perspective, bank failure data are often characterized by small default rates and heavy censoring. This empirical evidence can be explained by the existence of a subpopulation of banks likely immune from bankruptcy. In this regard, we use a mixture cure model to separate the factors with an influence on the susceptibility to default from the ones affecting the survival time of susceptible banks. In this paper, we extend a semi-parametric proportional hazards cure model to time-varying covariates and we propose a variable selection technique based on its penalized likelihood. By means of a simulation study, we show how this technique performs reasonably well. Finally, we illustrate an application to commercial bank failures in the United States over the period 2006-2016.

Keywords : statistics, synthetic data generation,

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